

Tokugawa System

Helen M. Hopper

By 1840, the Tokugawa family had maintained its political and economic supremacy over all of Japan for a little less than 250 years. The leader of this clan was the shogun (Jp. shōgun) or more formally the sei-i tai-shōgun, "supreme commander for the pacification of barbarians," who was declared to be the most powerful leader in Japan. Ruling from the largest city in the world, Edo (later renamed Tokyo in the Meiji period), the shogun demanded allegiance from the approximately 250-300 daimyō, to whom the shogun had offered lands throughout Japan. The system which had emerged in the 17th century became known as the bakuhan seido, or the system of rule between the central authority, bakufu, and the many domains, han, which the shogun had configured.

The Tokugawa family assumed this authority after defeating a formidable army of opposing clans at the battle of Sekigahara in 1600. The bakufu government thus formed and led by a Tokugawa shogun maintained legitimacy through his appointment to office by the weakened emperor who remained in Kyoto. The most powerful leader of each domain was called a daimyō, and he held that role through appointment by the shogun.

During the first century of shogun rule, political, economic, and social rules emerged which provided for the primacy of the bakufu over the han. This was ensured by the military superiority of the central authority at the Edo; by its large land holdings, heavily concentrated around Edo, but also spread throughout the rest of Honshū and Kyūshū and Shikoku; and by the political and social rules issued in its name which favored the shogun's power. Thus, for about one hundred years, the Tokugawa shoguns maintained tight control over the han. Japan's economy at this time was based on rice, and Tokugawa had by far the greatest area under rice cultivation. It also maintained the largest number of samurai, the military component of the system, and demanded and received allegiance from the 270 or so daimyō, and their samurai vassals, who lived in the established han. Through the mid-nineteenth century this system, though faltering significantly, continued to guarantee peace.

In its ideal form, the bakuhan system provided for central authority with power over the lives and livelihood of everyone residing in each han and the daimyō who was in charge. At the same time the daimyō had considerable power within his own lands as long as he did not break any of the rules sent down from Edo. In actuality, however, by 1840, this system had become only a shell of its former self, and much which remained

on paper and was plastered on placards and declared in proclamations was no longer working in fact.

The bakuhan system, 17th century

When Tokugawa Ieyasu defeated his enemies in 1600 and began the dynasty which was to last for over 250 years, he claimed large land holdings for himself and his household, gave land holdings with prescribed borders called han to those daimyō who had fought for him. Daimyō who fought against him in the battle were given a han in more remote, provincial, and less strategic areas of Japan. In this way he began the system which was designed to ensure Tokugawa power as well as peace in the land. As time went on his successors added laws to this system, further guaranteeing their own authority.

Without doubt the most unique law enacted to protect the power of the Tokugawa at Edo was the sankin-kōtai ("alternate attendance") system, which required that all daimyō build and maintain residences in Edo and reside in these expensive mansions every other year. The practical outcome of this law was that daimyō continuously spent huge amounts of their wealth and time traveling to and from Edo and could not watch over their domains as continuously or as thoroughly as they might otherwise have done. Sankin-kōtai, then, meant daimyō from all over Japan and large groups of attendants leaving their han members of each daimyō's family remained in Edo all of the time as "hostages" ensuring that there would be no attempt to overthrow the Tokugawa family. On the positive side this system of "alternate attendance" resulted in the development of roads, and more generally, communication and transportation systems, which would be the envy of Europeans who finally were able to view Japan in the mid-19th century.

Another primary feature of the bakuhan system at its strongest was the division of the society into classes, or perhaps better stated, the absolute definition of an appropriate status for each member of the society. Of course the highest status accrued to the shogun and those samurai of various ranks who were within the inner circle of his political power structure in Edo. And, by extension, in the han the daimyō and then his samurai had highest status. Theoretically these were all military men and therefore were supposed to be ready with the short and long sword to fight for the daimyō or the shogun whenever called upon. They were also the bureaucratic leaders in both bakufu and han and as such collected taxes, enforced laws, and saw to the general running of the central authority and the domains. Their samurai status and the various gradations therein gained them carefully calculated stipends of rice, the primary source of income, which they in turn sold for cash income.

Since rice was very important to the society, peasants who grew it represented the second class. Within this class there were many divisions, and status accrued depending on the amount of rice grown and the political and social roles within a village, with the village head usually the most powerful. Because both the samurai in the castle towns and the peasants in the villages had a great need for every sort of product and service, from farm tools, to swords, clothing, and buildings, the artisans were established as the third class and gained their status from products they made, such as swords, tools, stoves, horseshoes, and pottery. The fourth class was the merchants. This low designation derived from Confucian thinking, which taught that handling of finance and business operations, in general, were defiling. It was certainly not something that a samurai should indulge in. Although the samurai were paid in rice and it was necessary to work through a merchant broker to actually turn the rice that was not consumed into a medium of exchange, the fact remained that this was a dirty business and those who engaged in it, though necessary, were beneath cultivators and producers of products. Other members of the society such as doctors, teachers, artists, clergy, and so forth had status which placed above merchants, and sometimes gave them privileges of samurai. Finally, there were outcasts, handlers of meat and leather, people who cleaned up after executions and did other defiling jobs (see "Buddhism and Shinto"). These people (or hinin "non-humans") were below everyone except for the itinerant entertainers, such as jugglers, street musicians and traveling actors.

Looking at this ranking becomes immediately obvious that the rigidity and preciseness of the divisions would cause economic and social difficulties as time passed. How would a samurai who couldn't handle money maintain his livelihood? How could the society demand the services of the merchant, especially as more commerce developed, and assume that he would expect that he would accept as his reward a position which was almost the lowest on the scale? How would a samurai pass his time when a century and then two passed without war and there was no job for him commensurate with his status? How could rigidly defined legal status remain unchanged when actual roles had become so much more complex? In fact, over these two centuries it became increasingly clear that in many instances power had reversed itself. For example, the lowly merchant became more important to the daimyō and the shogun than the exalted samurai. Finally, if the samurai did have a military reason for his status, how would he react to the confrontation with 19th century foreign commercial intrusion and imperialism? Two centuries without military action left the samurai out of practice and without modern weapons, and the country in general well behind the West in technological knowledge.

Changing times, ca. 1800

Tokugawa power over its own vessels and the approximately 270 han began to wane by the early 18th century. The system was simply too rigid to accommodate the economic

changes which assaulted the status of these class divisions, especially those between the samurai and merchants. The beginnings of commercial enterprises throughout Japan, but particularly in central and western Honshū, as well as the disappearance of adequate employment for the disused military class, passed by the bakufu, which required all samurai to live in castle towns and all peasants to remain on the land in villages, so further separating the samurai from gainful employment in most han.

While the samurai continued to collect his stipend, this too was out of step with the times. His wealth was counted in koku of rice (one koku is a little over 5 bushels) based on the formula which calculated one koku would feed an adult for a year. But there was a catch here. The number of koku which any particular samurai received was based on production which could be expected from lands owned by the han and distributed on paper to each samurai member of the han according to his particular status. That might have sufficed even for the lowliest samurai, except for the fact that the stated number of koku, the 50% to 60% which would cover expenses and consumption of the cultivating peasants, often left a lower status samurai without enough rice for his family to live on, let alone to exchange for currency to spend on other needs.

Meanwhile the merchant who provided the services which exchanged the rice for currency and who kept track of the exchange was beginning to see his wealth increase, at least on paper. And yet, he remained stuck on the lowest rung in the class system. The merchants lived in castle towns and the three major cities, Edo, the political capital, Osaka, the "kitchen," and Kyoto, the imperial capital, keeping track of everyone's rice, developing new commercial ventures, and lending more and more money to the impoverished samurai, the daimyō and the shogun.

The peasants were not allowed to leave their land and found themselves over time becoming more and more efficient in agriculture production but retaining less and less of their produce while paying more and more in rents and taxes. Consequently many turned from rice cultivation to new commercial ventures based on cash crops such as cotton, tobacco, rapeseed, and so forth. Peasants had augmented their income for some time through raising silkworms and through spinning and weaving, enterprises carried out primarily by the women in the family. But as living became more difficult toward the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th century, they sought new ways of coping with their situations. The recurrent famines brought about by poor weather conditions in different parts of Japan which played havoc with agricultural production, and other calamities of nature such as earthquakes and epidemics, affected the peasant population dramatically.

Accelerated Problems of the Tenpō Era (1830-1844)

During the 1830s, Japan entered another period of severe famine and suffering. The new era, begun in 1830, was called Tenpō, or "Protected by Heaven," carefully named to ensure the powerful kami (gods) would surround the country with a protective aura. It was not to be. Planting the new rice crop in the spring of 1833 was hampered by unusual cold weather, and, in the fall, what had grown over the summer was decimated dramatically by early snowfalls. This was, as usual, most costly in the northern part of Honshū, or the Tōhoku area. But the reduction in harvest was also felt in the Tokugawa lands and the han to the West. This was the first of four poor harvests in succession resulting in famine in many parts of Japan. Death by starvation was particularly devastating in Tōhoku, but most of the entire country suffered to some degree.

While the agricultural disasters did not affect the entire domain equally, they were widespread enough to cause the people to go beyond simply petitioning the shogun and their daimyō for relief. These years between 1833 and 1837 witnessed peasant uprisings which exceeded in both seriousness and number those which had occurred in the past. Urban centers were also affected or the inhabitants of the castle towns rioted and demanded relief. One of the most famous incidents took place in Osaka in the second month of 1837. There, a former bakufu police inspector, Ōshio Heihachirō, wrote a treatise demanding help from the authorities in the punishment of the rich Osaka merchants whom he claimed were squeezing the last drop of blood from the impoverished town dwellers and peasants. Ōshio was determined to banish the evil as embodied in the merchant, which he saw destroying ordinary citizens. He called for the destitute people to rise up and execute these selfish money mongers, take their gold and silver, and empty their storehouses of rice for distribution among the poor. Carrying out his plan with the aid of a few rebel converts, he set fire to over three thousand merchant houses and burned up thousands of koku of rice, which the evil merchants had stored. Unfortunately for Ōshio the riot was put down within twelve hours by bakufu forces who killed or arrested and tortured the participants. Ōshio, who had managed to elude the bakufu's soldiers for a month, was finally discovered. In accordance with his Confucian thinking, he killed himself and his wounded son before they could be taken into custody.

This uprising was brief and unsuccessful but it exemplified the political and economic problems which would continue to plague the bakufu. Ōshio's motivation represented a kind of Confucian moralism based on the belief that the country's leaders should protect and provide for the people, especially during times of economic crisis, and, when they failed to do so, the people had every right, in fact a duty, to overthrow them. He also elevated the impotent imperial household in his pantheon of leaders to a position above the shogun and called for restoration of imperial power. Unlike the implication of the name of the era, Tenpō, heaven was definitely not protecting Japan and the fault, Ōshio thought, lay at the door of the bakufu. Something had to be done.

Even the shogun, who certainly would not have agreed with Ōshio's reasoning, realized that some sort of reforms was needed if his regime were to survive. The crop failures, famine, and epidemics and the peasant uprising and urban riots had intensified the economic and social tension already evident in the bakuhan system. Also, there had been a few times since the beginning of the 19th century when the emperor in Kyoto, supported by his court, had attempted to raise issues of imperial rights. The shogun had managed so far to thwart the possibility of any real sharing of power. When necessary this was accomplished with a ceremonial show of military force in the hundreds of thousands. The court, however, with its long tradition, religious authority, and trained retinue of administrative courtiers was available if needed. In the 1830s official documents pronounced the sitting emperor as the 120th in direct line from the goddess Amaterasu who was claimed to have founded Japan. Although most ordinary people in Japan had little knowledge and cared less about the imperial court and its pomp and circumstance, past history suggested a grander role for the emperor to play on the national level should the shogun stumble. All these internal pressures, however, represented only one part of the crisis which was unraveling the political fabric of the country.

The West Notices Japan

In the 17th century, the early shoguns had determined to isolate Japan in an attempt to keep it safe from outside intrusion. The resultant policy called sakoku halted all trade with most foreigners while maintaining the commerce and exchange of knowledge considered essential by the bakufu. A small window for commerce with the West was provided for on a man-made island just off Nagasaki in Kyūshū. This island, Dejima, became the official headquarters for trade. This suited the bakufu's perceived needs for foreign goods, books, and technology very well, and the Dutch enjoyed their monopoly as the only Western nation with entrée into Japan. However, the world was changing, and by the 1800s other foreign ships challenged the right of Japan to isolate itself in this manner. The first Westerners to try to insinuate their way into the country were from Imperial Russia. They approached Japan through its official foreign port at Nagasaki asking permission to open trade with Japan. The refusal took several months to be issued from Edo but it came nonetheless with the statement that only Dutch, Chinese, Koreans and Ryūkyūans had traditionally been permitted to trade and this custom could not be changed. Other commercial ships from Russia and Britain, and whalers from America shipwrecked off the coast of Japan sought to penetrate Japan from the north, south, and off the eastern coast.

Commercial ships were turned away and shipwrecked sailors from American clipper ships were treated inhumanely if they made it to shore. A pattern, however, was beginning to take shape and the shogun and his coastal daimyō felt threatened. Given

the military incompetence of both the bakufu and the coastal domains it seemed only be a matter of time before foreigners would force their way into Japan.

During the time that Tenpō famine was at its height, in the summer of 1837, an American ship based in Canton in China, the Morrison, sailed from Macao to Japan with two Americans, a businessman and a missionary, masterminding the voyage, and accompanied by seven Japanese castaways. The American instigators believed that having Japanese on board would ensure that the ship would be welcomed in Edo Bay. The bakufu, fearful of foreign intruders forcing themselves on his country in the same manner that they had in neighboring China, fired on the Morrison with the few mortars available. When the ship tried later to land at Kagoshima on the tip of Kyūshū, the daimyō of Satsuma domain greeted the interlopers in the same manner.

Many in both the bakufu and the coastal domains realized, however, that they would be no match for an invasion of greater strength. Upon returning to China the angered Americans sent a message home demanding that the United States send an expedition of warships with an ultimatum that Japan open itself up to commerce and treat castaways in a civilized manner. The United States did not ready the warships yet, but the bakufu could see the specter of foreign intrusion and began to worry that the bakufu system might be ripe for challenge from the outside.

Even though international commerce was limited to ships from only one Western country, Japan's leaders were not ignorant of worldwide events. The Dutch brought news of the outside world of the West to the bakufu both in sketches of newsworthy events and scientific, medical, and technological knowledge. Japan's close neighbors, the Chinese, brought news of their own struggle with the Western world. Consequently, Japan was well aware of the course that the Opium War between Britain and China (1840-1842) took, and recognized that China suffered greatly from inadequate military preparedness and inferior technology and fire power. The Japanese leaders learned quite soon how unfavorable the terms of the Treaty of 1842 were for China. Most worrying were rights demanding for British nationals who would be permitted to reside there. Japan sadly, and correctly, concluded that British would soon be knocking at their door.

Baku-Han Tenpō Reforms

Beginning as early as 1833 when the first crop failures were reported several of the domains attempted to instigate reforms which would answer the economic needs of their subjects and stave off further uprisings, the bakufu was slower in responding to the crisis but by 1837 it too was seeking answers to the problems which were rocking the regime. Domain reforms were colored by the particular location, power, and wealth of

each individual daimyō as well as by his intelligence and imagination as a leader. No two domains answered the pleas of the people in the same manner, and often domains which were adjacent or had some product of significance attempted to seal their borders and protect their own livelihoods rather than work with neighbors. The shogun did not have the luxury of just looking to its own vast land holdings and solving the problems within its own lands. He had try to create reforms in such a way as to stave off revolt against his much weakened central authority and maintain allegiance of the daimyō. Both Edo and domain officials recognized that change was urgently needed, but neither was always effective in drawing up policies which might solve the crisis.

Some of the wealthier han, which had not suffered significantly from agricultural disaster, managed to implement policies which strengthened their power. Some of the ways in which all of the han attempted to replenish their drained treasuries included borrowing from or cutting the stipends of their samurai, many of whom were essentially unproductive; trying to reclaim more land for rice cultivation; increasing taxes; and bolstering existing monopolies or creating new ones in such products of high cash value as cotton, lacquer, pottery, silk, sugar, paper, tobacco. In fact some of this appeared to strengthen a daimyō's position but often did little for the distressed population as a whole.

The bakufu suffered great losses to its treasury in the 1830s and had very little idea as to how to turn its losses around. Although much of the land owned by the Tokugawa family was located near Edo, some fiefs were at some distance from the capital. These lands were administered by Tokugawa bureaucrats or by bureaucrats of trusted han. In both instances officials loyal to the Tokugawa were responsible for collecting taxes. As the terrible weather destroyed more of the rice crop it became harder to collect taxes. Also, part of the shogun's role was to protect his people and provide relief during desperate times. His only recourse, it seemed, was to demand more from his own samurai and from the daimyō. His financial need was great, for he was required to provide famine relief and tax reduction for destitute peasants, deploy his military to put down town and village riots, and to find food supplies for his cities. None of these actions were particularly effective and in fact tended to deplete the bakufu treasury even further.

By 1841 the bakufu began what has since been called the Tenpō Reforms. In fact these were hardly dramatic. As had often been the case in the past the shogun saw immorality as the cause of the crisis. He applied the time worn solutions such as curbing immoral activities by demanding that people refrain from gambling, visiting prostitutes, spending on luxuries such as art, clothing, and household goods. He also prohibited the evils of entertainment and festivals and in general tried to cut back on spending habits of those who had anything left to spend. To increase the treasury at a time when tax

collection was falling and rice had to be distributed to the poor, he debased the currency, forced the merchants to loan money, and borrowed from his own samurai. One extraordinary reform which the bakufu instituted was the outlawing of monopolies. Since the domains had maintained monopolies to their advantage for some time and this was important to their financial health, this was an unwelcome program.

Since the British had successfully defeated the Chinese in the so-called Opium War (1840-1842), the shogun had before him the startling information about superior weaponry and military strategy of a Western power. He was quite worried about what the collapse of his powerful neighbor would mean for his own country. He was alarmed by the fact that ships brought round the world and soldiers fighting on foreign shores could make the Chinese kowtow in their own land to foreigners from afar. The shogun determined that both bakufu and han should modernize their defenses. In fact, not much happened. Just the same, at least the bakufu realized that it would need to study the outfitting of a modern warship, learn about the latest weaponry technology, and try to revive its samurai in line with Western notions of military strategy and tactics. The coastal han also saw the possible crisis brewing and some of them began reforms of their own. Some even began to look to non-samurai, commoners, to form parts of their military.

Nakatsu, a han in Kyūshū

The daimyō of the Nakatsu domain, located in northern Kyūshū, had fought with the Tokugawa in 1600 and therefore was among those clans favored by the bakufu. Though not one of the richest han with several hundreds of thousand koku of rice in calculated wealth, Nakatsu was in the top half of all domains and considerably richer than the many with just 10,000 koku, the smallest amount necessary to support a daimyō. In fact the Nakatsu han was evaluated at 1,000,000 koku. Many of these holdings were in Buzen Province (present day Ōita) on the Inland Sea. The rest were in an area around Hiroshima further along the Inland Sea route on the main island of Honshu. The Inland Sea location of both these portions insured that clan leader and town merchants would find an interest in commerce. In addition, Nakatsu han had responsibility for management of bakufu lands in Buzen which had been surveyed at an even higher production rate than its own domain. Although the Nakatsu daimyō did not receive a share of this cultivation, he was responsible for policing the area, collecting the shogun's taxes, and settling village disputes.

The castle town of Nakatsu and its surrounding villages were just south of a larger han, Kokura, with 150,000 koku, also loyal to the Tokugawa. Nakatsu and Kokura, and a few much smaller domains were established in Kyūshū to watch over the daimyō who had fought against the Tokugawa. This system of land distribution, which included far-flung

scattered holdings of the bakufu itself, constituted yet another safeguard of the shogun's power. In effect Nakatsu han and Kokura han and even the small domains looked after the bakufu's interest and reported any apparent opposition to the central authority. Of course, in the course of the two hundred years the han in Kyūshū became less hostile to each other and felt more distant from Edo. At one point the Okudaira, the daimyō family of Nakatsu, adopted an heir from the Shimazu family of Satsuma, Kyūshū's largest han, to cement relationships with one of the most powerful daimyō in all of Japan. Just the same the Nakatsu daimyō and his vassal samurai continued to consider themselves supporters of the bakufu.

Nakatsu was about twelfth in wealth among about 130 domains which were awarded by the shogun to supporters of the Tokugawa. The vast majority of these received lands worth 50,000 koku or less. Greater in wealth by far were the domains assigned to the clans which fought against the winners. The new shogun was not intent upon destroying all clans who had opposed his claim to supremacy, but rather wanted to keep them in check. To accomplish this he abolished some clans entirely, cut holdings of others, and both cut holdings and moved the most powerful families who had opposed him to places distant from Edo. In Kyūshū alone there were five large han for the samurai from Nakatsu to keep an eye on. The largest of these was controlled by the daimyō, Shimazu, in Satsuma Province in the far south with its castle town at Kagoshima. This han was assessed at almost 800,000 koku of rice. There was only one other defeated clan with greater wealth in Japan. Of course the Tokugawa remained the wealthiest of all controlling lands assessed at about seven million of koku rice which were divided among various houses within the family. Over the next two hundred years some daimyō lost their lands. Other gained some land and several new domains and daimyō were created, but the total number of domains remained between about 230-300 in number at any time.

Like all other daimyō, Okudaira of Nakatsu agreed to follow the laws set down by the shogun. He swore that he would provide warriors from Nakatsu's contingent of 1,500 samurai, with horses and weapons, when called upon, and laborers when needed for road repair, river control, and other public works projects initiated by Edo. Of course, he had to live every other year in Edo and arrive there with a large entourage of samurai, bearers of household goods, porters for hand-carried palanquins (kago), horses, and pack mules. Meanwhile the daimyō must be assured that administrators at home oversaw the collection of rice stipends for himself and his samurai from the agricultural villages which surrounded the castle town. There were also other taxes to collect in kind and in the currency which circulated within the domain. After two hundred years the domain was still calculated at 100,000 koku but the actual production varied from year to year. Since the peasants had to retain something to live, that 100,000 koku amounted to no more than 40,000-50,000 upon receipt in either kind of or cash. This percentage of

40%-60% between samurai/daimyō and cultivator was about the same throughout Japan. Okudaira and his samurai might be counted officially as the highest class in Nakatsu but they were, in fact, relatively strapped financially by 1835.

Japanese peasants living in villages were the backbone of the economic system. They had to cultivate all types of land, rice paddies, dry fields, and forest lands, and produce enough to cover the assessed valuation as surveyed in the 17th and 18th early centuries. In 19th century Nakatsu, the population stood at about 80,000 with 1,500 of those classified as samurai, and therefore automatically receiving a rice stipend. Like the rest of Japan, at least 80% of the domain's populace were peasants living in villages in the hills and valleys which surrounded the castle town and they were responsible, village by village, for producing a stipulated share of the 100,000 koku of rice the land was surveyed to produce. The measuring was done by the daimyō's tax collectors and usually favored the authorities. The peasants worked hard, improved their production through reclamation of land and implementation of new technologies, and yet, for the most part, never had more than their status, and did not receive equal compensation. For example, village headmen and officials, who had substantial power, took a larger share of the production, and lived better than the other peasants. Situated as it was in Kyūshū, Nakatsu peasants tended to be better off than others in Japan. They were not affected by the Tenpō famine of the mid-1830s and, in general, did not experience the fluctuation of production due to violent weather changes that kept Tōhoku peasants and so many villagers in other parts of Japan impoverished during times of famine.

The 1830s, then, were times of significant change for the shogun and his vassal daimyō. In hindsight, it is easy to see that the bakufu system would have to change substantially if the country or any of its territorial subdivisions were to survive economically. Even during the 1830s, many officials in both the bakufu and some of the han could see that the rigidity of the social system, the decline of the agricultural wealth and rural stability, and the rise of commercial ventures demanded more complex responses than those provided by the Tenpō reforms. Equally important, the bakufu and the coastal domains recognized that it was only a matter of time before Western nations would be coercing Japan just as they had China. The fact of internal and external pressure for change was too obvious to be completely overlooked. The issue, then, was just about how each player in the grand scheme of history responded. What would the shogun and his counselors do to try to retain Tokugawa wealth and power? How would the various daimyō, especially those with larger land holdings, respond to this crisis? Might the strong daimyō demand a greater share of Tokugawa power? Might the emperor and his court seize the opportunity to elevate their position?

Complete answers to these questions would not be known for several decades, but the threads of the fabric of the future were already on the loom. The 1840s would be a

decade of great flux in some circles and stasis in others, as individual figures within the dying Tokugawa society attempted to move forward to a new era or hold on to the past. Here was a moment which held opportunity for those with foresight and doom to others. Fast moving internal and external events of the 1850s and 1860s would dramatically change Japan as it moved toward a new era called Meiji.

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Suggested Reading

Dunn, Charles. *Everyday Life in Traditional Japan*. Tokyo and Rutland, Vermont: C.E. Tuttle Co., 1972. An approachable and thoughtful treatment of Tokugawa society in all its aspects, with excellent illustrations.

Hall, John Whitney. *The Cambridge History of Japan: Vol. 4, Early Modern Japan*. New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. Now the standard history of this period.

Jansen, Marius B. *The Cambridge History of Japan: Vol. 5, the Nineteenth Century*. New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. Again, the standard.

Mori Ōgai, "Ōshio Heihachirō," in J. Thomas Rimer, ed. *Not a Song Like Any Other: An Anthology of Writings by Mori Ōgai*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2004. A lengthy and detailed, lightly fictionalized account of his revolt, based on a meticulous examination of the historical facts.